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Abstract 
 
This study investigates U.S. state economic growth from 1970-1999.  I innovate on 
previous studies by developing a new approach for addressing “model uncertainty” issues 
associated with estimating growth equations.  My approach borrows from the “extreme 
bounds analysis” (EBA) approach of Leamer (1985), while also addressing concerns 
raised by Granger and Uhlig (1990), Salai-Martin (1997) and others that not all 
specifications are equally likely to be true.  I then apply this approach to identify “robust” 
determinants of state economic growth.  My analysis confirms the importance of 
productivity characteristics of the labor force and industrial composition of a state’s 
economy.  I also find that policy variables such as (i) size and structure of government 
and (ii) taxation are “robust” and economically important determinants of state economic 
growth.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is now well-established that economic growth studies reach different conclusions 
depending on model specification.  This has been documented repeatedly in the literature 
on cross-country growth regressions1 and in studies of growth in U.S. states.2  In 
response, attempts have been made to identify “robust” variables, the “best” model 
specification, or ways of combining alternative model specifications (e.g., Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Granger and Uhlig, 1990; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; 
Fernandez, et al., 2001; Sala-i-Martin, et al., 2004; Hoover and Perez, 2004; Hendry and 
Krolzig, 2004). 
 This study follows in this line of research by attempting to identify “robust” 
determinants of U.S. economic growth from 1970-1999.  I innovate on previous studies 
by developing a new approach for addressing “model uncertainty” issues associated with 
estimating growth equations.  My approach borrows from the “extreme bounds analysis” 
(EBA) approach of Leamer (1985), while also addressing concerns raised by Granger and 
Uhlig (1990), Salai-Martin (1997) and others that not all specifications are equally likely 
to be true.  I then apply this approach by sifting through a very large number of 
explanatory variables in order to find “robust” determinants of state economic growth.  
My analysis confirms the importance of productivity characteristics of the labor force and 
industrial composition of a state’s economy.  I also find that policy variables such as (i) 
                                                 
1 Studies that have examined the robustness of coefficient estimates in the context of cross-country growth 
regressions include Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Fernández et al. (2001), Hendry and 
Krolzig (2004), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), and Hoover and Perez (2004). 
2  The following studies have highlighted the phenomenon of wide-ranging coefficient estimates across 
empirical specifications:  Bartik, 1992; McGuire, 1992, Phillips and Goss, 1995; Wasylenko, 1997; and 
Crain and Lee, 1999. 
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the size and structure of government and (ii) taxation are “robust” determinants of state 
economic growth.   
 The paper proceeds as follows:  Section II develops a theoretical model of state 
economic growth that provides the framework for the subsequent empirical analysis.  
Section III describes the full set of variables used in this study.  Section IV presents my 
approach for identifying “robust” determinants of economic growth.  Section V describes 
my data and discusses details about the estimation procedure.  Section VI presents the 
empirical results.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  A THEORETICAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
I assume that state income ( tY  ) is determined by the following generalized Cobb-
Douglas production function,  
(1) βαββα ttttttttt LKQAQLKAY == )( , 
where tQ  is the efficiency of labor and tA  is a time-varying, scaling variable that 
includes factor-neutral technology shocks.3 
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 Differentiating Equation (3) with respect to time yields 
                                                 
3 This specification is very similar to that employed by Lee and Gordon (2005).   
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where [ ] [ ])(Q ln)(Q ln)(A ln)(A lnC L-ttL-ttt −+−= β  and L = the length of the time 
period minus 1 (i.e., for a five-year period with t measuring calendar years, L  = 4).45   
 This theoretical structure specifically identifies changes in capital, employment, 
and population as important determinants of economic growth.  However, the last term, 
tC , is sufficiently general that any number of variables could be argued for inclusion.   
 
III.  POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF STATE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
TABLE 1 lists a number of variables that have been suggested in previous studies of 
economic growth, primarily U.S. state economic growth.  The empirical task of this paper 
consists of identifying which of these should be included in a growth equation along with 
capital, employment, and population variables. 
 I group the variables into 4 major categories:  (A) Population/Labor Force 
characteristic, (B) Economy characteristics, (C) Public Sector characteristics, and (D) 
Political Control characteristics.  Variables included in the Population/Labor Force 
category include educational attainment, percent of the population that is working-aged 
(ages between 20 and 64), percent of the population that is nonwhite or female, and total 
                                                 
4 In the subsequent empirical work, the difference in log values is multiplied by 100. 
5 An alternative specification solves for the steady state value of y as a function of state parameters, and 
then introduces convergence through the inclusion of a lagged value of the dependent variable.  This both 
(i) imposes additional restrictions on the model and (ii) raises econometric issues of inconsistency from 
using both fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variables.  Nevertheless, the 
approach of this paper is readily applied to selecting control variables for this, and other, specifications. 
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population.  Economy characteristics include population density, degree of urbanization, 
the relative importance of various industries within the state, percent of the workforce 
that is unionized, and a measure of industrial diversity. 
 Public Sector characteristics are divided into three subcategories: (i) Size and 
Structure variables, (ii) Tax variables, and (iii) Expenditure variables.  Each of these can 
be thought of representing a particular component of public policy.  Size and Structure 
variables include the size of the (i) federal and (ii) state and local government sectors of 
the economy, measured both by share of total earnings and employment.  Also included 
are the amount of federal government revenue received by state and local governments; 
the degree to which expenditures are made at the local, as opposed to the state, level; and 
the number of governments. 
 Tax variables include a measure of the overall importance of state and local taxes 
in the state’s economy (“tax burden”), measured as a share of state personal income.  
Also included are specific types of taxes, such as property, sales, individual income and 
corporate income taxes.  Ideally, I would have liked to have measured these latter tax 
variables as shares of total tax revenues.  This would have been most appropriate for 
investigating the compositional effects of the tax burden.  Unfortunately, data problems 
prevented me from doing this.6  Instead, the specific types of taxes are also measured as 
shares of personal income.   
 Expenditure variables measure the compositional effects of state and local 
government spending.  The specific expenditure categories are primary and secondary 
education, higher education, public health, and highways.  Each of the respective 
                                                 
6 A problem arises in that sales and income tax data are not separately reported for local governments, so 
that the shares of the respective tax subcategories do not sum to one. 
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expenditure variables is measured as a share of total state and local (direct general) 
spending.   
 Finally, Political Control variables measure the influence of political parties.  
These include how often the Democratic and Republican parties control the state 
legislature, and how often the governor is a Democrat. 
 These preceding variables attempt to capture the economic influences represented 
by [ ] [ ])ln)ln)ln)ln L-ttL-ttt (Q (Q (A (A C −+−= β  in Equation (5).  One immediate issue is 
whether the 32 variables in TABLE 1 should be entered in (i) level or (ii) difference 
form.  Because economic theory is not sufficiently specific to answer this question, this 
becomes an empirical issue.  Restricting the Political Control variables to be entered in 
level form,7 and recognizing that the change in population is already included in the core 
specification of Equation (5) (i.e., [ ])ln)ln L-tt (N (N − ), leads to a total of 60 possible 
explanatory variables.   
 There are approximately 1810151 ×.  ways to combine 60 variables.  Each of these 
permutations, appending a core set of “free” variables, can be thought of as a single 
model.  Thus, the empirical problem consists of choosing the best model, or set of 
models, from these 1810151 ×.  possibilities.  One might think that it was computationally 
unfeasible to estimate so many models.  While this is true, there exist algorithms that 
allow me to circumvent this problem.  
 
                                                 
7 Unlike the other variables in TABLE 1, the Political Control variables represent the average number of 
years in which a political party is in control during the respective 5-year period.  There is no analog to 5-
year differences that would correspond to the 5-year differences for the other variables in TABLE 1.   
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IV.  A PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING “ROBUST” VARIABLES 
 
The SIC and the AICc.  The first step in my approach consists of identifying a “best” 
specification:  I employ two model selection criteria for this purpose: the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC); and the corrected version of the Akaike Information 
Criterion, known as AICc.  While I will give a brief description of these criteria, more 
detailed discussions can be found in McQuarrie and Tsai (1998), Burnham and Anderson 
(2002), and the references therein. 
 The SIC and the AICc respectively represent the two main, competing schools of 
thought regarding how to conceptualize the task of selecting the “best” model.  If the 
researcher believes that the true model is included within the set of candidate models, 
then a desirable property of a model selection procedure is that it be “consistent.”  That 
is, that it selects the true model with probability converging to one as the sample size 
becomes infinitely large.  The SIC is by far the most commonly used of the several model 
selection criteria that possess this property (other consistent criteria include the Hannan 
and Quinn [HQ] criterion, and the Geweke and Meese [GM] criterion). 
 Alternatively, if the researcher believes that the true model is not included within 
the set of candidate models, then a desirable property of a model selection procedure is 
that it be “efficient.”  That is, that it selects the model that is “closest” to the true model, 
where “closest” is defined by some distance or information criterion.  A selection 
procedure is said to be “asymptotically efficient” if it selects the model closest to the true 
model with probability converging to one as the sample size becomes infinitely large.   
 A number of model selection procedures have been developed that have the 
property of asymptotic efficiency, including Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPE), 
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Mallow’s Cp criterion, and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  Of these, the AIC is 
by far the most widely employed.  However, many researchers have noted that the AIC 
suffers from over-fitting in finite samples, incorporating too many variables in its best 
models.  As a result, a number of finite sample corrections have been developed for the 
AIC.  Of these, the most preferred is a version known as AICc (Sugiura, 1978; Hurvich 
and Tsai, 1989).   
 Monte Carlo studies of finite sample performance have demonstrated that both the 
SIC and AICc perform well relative to alternative procedures (cf. McQuarrie and Tsai, 
1998).  While there are a number of equivalent formulations, this study uses the 
following formulae: 
(6) ( )Tlnk
n
SSElnTICS ⋅+

⋅= , and  
(7) 


−−
−+⋅+
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⋅=
1kT
1kTT
n
SSElnTAICc , 
where T is the number of observations; k is the number of coefficients in the model, 
including the intercept; and SSE is the sum of squared residuals from the estimated 
model.  Note that SSE and k are the only parameters that vary across models, since 
sample size and the dependent variable do not change.  The SIC and AICc make different 
tradeoffs between these parameters.  Generally, the SIC penalizes additional explanatory 
variables more severely than the AICc, producing “best” models with fewer variables. 
 Conceptually, I need a program that will sort through all 181015.1 ×  possible 
linear combinations of the 60 variables (level plus difference forms) identified in TABLE 
1 in order to select the best model specification according to each selection criterion.  For 
this task, I use the SELECTION = RSQUARE option within the REG procedure 
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available through SAS.  While this procedure does not actually estimate all possible 
regression specifications, it can identify the best specifications within each set of all 
possible specifications having the same number of regressors.  In this, it relies on the 
“leaps and bounds” algorithm developed by Furnival and Wilson (1974).  It is 
straightforward to use the output generated by this SAS program to calculate a ranked 
ordering of the M overall best specifications -- for any predetermined value of M -- 
according to either the SIC or AICc criterion.8  The corresponding SAS program is easy 
to write and remarkably efficient in computational requirements.  It required about an 
hour to run using a standard desktop computer.9   
 Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Model Averaging.  My approach uses 
insights from both “extreme bounds analysis” (EBA; Leamer, 1983) and “Bayesian 
model averaging” (BMA; Hoeting et al., 1999).  Therefore, it is useful to consider these 
before proceeding. 
 EBA is designed to study the sensitivity of coefficient estimates across different 
regression specifications.  For example, suppose a researcher wants to measure the effect 
of variable X1 on variable Y.  EBA proceeds by estimating a large number of 
specifications that include X1, noting the upper and lower bounds of the resulting range of 
1β  estimates.  If the range of 1βˆ  values are all same-signed and more than two standard 
                                                 
8 The general principle of the “leaps and bounds algorithm” can be illustrated in the context of a “regression 
tree:” Consider the case of 5 “doubtful’ variables, X1 through X5.  At the top of the regression tree are 
models with only 1 regressor.  At the bottom of the tree are models with more variables.  Suppose the R2 
from the model having only one regressor,  X1, is larger than the R2 from a model with the four regressors 
X2 through X5.  In this case, the model with the highest R2 must lie on the “node” below X1.  This eliminates 
the necessity of estimating large portions of the “regression tree,” which greatly reduces the computational 
burden.  Further details are given in Furnival and Wilson (1974).  SAS uses this algorithm and sorts the 
“best” R2 models within subsets of specifications having the same number of regressors.  I calculate SIC 
and AICc values within these subsets, where highest R2 equates with lowest SIC/AICc values, and then 
globally rank the ‘best” specifications across all subsets.   
9 A copy of the program used in this analysis is given in Appendix B. 
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deviations away from zero, then variable X1 is said to be “robust” (cf. Levine and Renelt, 
1992; Crain and Lee, 1999). 
 The main criticism of EBA is that it weights all model specifications equally, so 
that a divergent coefficient estimate from a poorly specified equation can be sufficient to 
disqualify a variable as “robust.”  In recognition of this shortcoming, Granger and Uhlig 
(1990) propose “reasonable extreme bounds analysis,” where the range of coefficient 
values is restricted to the set of specifications that produce R2 values within a given δ -
value of the maximum achieved R2 across all specifications.  However, they do not 
provide guidance for the choice of δ  and acknowledge that the use of R2 has problems. 
 BMA directly addresses the “all specifications weighted equally” criticism by 
developing a system for weighting model specifications.  BMA starts by positing a prior 
distribution for the population value for some parameter of the model specification 
(usually a regression coefficient).  This prior distribution is updated with the results from 
regression estimates across (theoretically) all possible model specifications to form a 
posterior distribution of parameter values.  The updating procedure weights the 
corresponding specifications by model probabilities that can be thought of as the 
conditional probability that a given specification is the “true model.”10   
 While the BMA approach is useful for weighting specifications for forecasting 
purposes, it is problematic when used to weight coefficient estimates.  Consider the 
following example:  Suppose a researcher is interested in the relationship between 
dependent variable y and an explanatory variable, X1.   Let the true model be given by 
                                                 
10 It is a conditional probability because the probabilities are calculated over the set of “included” model 
specifications. 
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variables, and we suppose the researcher considers each combination a potentially true 
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where jk  and jSSE  are the number of included regressors and the sum of squared 
residuals in Model j.  The corresponding (posterior) expected value of 1β  is given by  
(9) ( ) ( ) j,12
1j
j1
ˆy|MPy|E
K
ββ ⋅= ∑
=
,  
where j,1βˆ  is the estimate of 1β  in Model j. 
 In each specification in which X1 appears, the preceding assumptions insure that 
the least squares estimate is unbiased, so that ( ) 1j,1ˆE ββ = .  However, 1X  appears in only 
half of all possible specifications.  In the other 1K2 −  models, 1X  is excluded, and the 
BMA approach sets 0ˆ j,1 =β .11  It follows that ( ) 11 y|E ββ <  even if 1j,1ˆ ββ =  in every 
specification in which it appears.  In other words, the BMA-based expectation is biased 
                                                 
11 Compare Equations (8) and (9) with Equations (7) and (8) in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004, p. 817) and note 
that in that context they write, “…any variable excluded from a particular model has a slope coefficient 
with a degenerate posterior distribution at zero.” 
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towards zero.  This follows directly from the fact that BMA “estimates” the value of 1β  
to be zero in all specifications in which 1X  is not included.
12 
 A Less Extreme Bounds Analysis.  My approach borrows elements from both 
EBA and BMA.  Like EBA, I estimate a set of specifications and report the 
corresponding ranges of coefficient estimates and t-ratios for those specifications 
including the respective variables.  However, like BMA, I do not give all specifications 
equal weight.  I follow a procedure developed by Poskitt and Tremayne (PK; 1987) to 
identify two categories of models: (i) “reasonable” models, and (ii) others.  Only 
“reasonable” models are considered for extreme bounds analysis. 
 PK take as their point of departure that informational criteria such as the SIC and 
the AICc are themselves sample statistics, so that the model with the lowest SIC or AICc 
value may not be the best model.  They argue that all “close competitors” be included in a 
“portfolio” of “reasonable” models.   
 Let *I  be the value of the information criterion for the best model, and let AI  be 
the corresponding value for an alternative model.  The posterior odds ratio is defined as 
(10) ( ) −⋅−=ℜ A* II2Texp .   
                                                 
12 There are other problems with using the BMA approach.  First, the results are sensitive to assumptions 
about the prior parameter distribution. For example, in order to implement their version of BMA known as 
Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) must first specify an 
“expected model size.”  While they claim that their final results are “robust” across different assumptions 
about this parameter, they acknowledge that this is not true in all cases:  Some of the variables that are 
“significant” under a given assumed “expected model size” become “insignificant” under a different 
assumed “expected model size” -- and vice versa.  Second, there are important computational issues.  BMA 
does not actually estimate all possible specifications.  Instead, it uses sampling procedures (e.g., Markov 
chain Monte Carlo procedures, of which the Gibbs sampler is the best known) to estimate the “probability” 
that a given specification is the true one.  There is no standard sampling algorithm, which raises the 
possibility that the results will be idiosyncratic to the program used by the individual researcher.  Finally, 
the weighting probabilities are derived from Bayesian statistical foundations and are closely related to the 
SIC criterion defined above.  As we shall see below, alternative criteria, such as the AICc, produce 
different results. 
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Following Jeffreys (1961, p. 143) and Zellner (1977), PK characterize any model with 
10<ℜ  as a “close competitor” to the best model: 
“…any…specification satisfying 10<ℜ  may be thought of as a close 
competitor.  This intimates that it may be advantageous to extend the usual 
model building process.  It suggests not only that the model minimizing 
the criterion should be selected, but also that any additional specifications 
closely competing…should not be discarded, thereby advancing the 
general notion of a portfolio of models” (Poskitt and Tremayne, 1987, p. 
127). 
 
PK go on to present Monte Carlo evidence that model portfolios constructed in this 
manner behave well in finite samples. 
 To summarize, my approach constructs separate model portfolios using SIC and 
AICc selection methods.  For each portfolio, I identify “robust” variables in a manner 
similar to conventional EBA.  In this respect, my approach is similar to Granger and 
Uhlig’s (1990) “reasonable extreme bounds analysis,” except that I use information 
criteria, not R2, to evaluate models, and the set of evaluated models is determined by 
PK’s 10<ℜ  standard, rather than an arbitary δ  value.   
 
V.  DATA AND FURTHER ESTIMATION ISSUES 
My data consist of observations on 46 U.S. states from 1970-1999.13  I decided on this 
particular time period because a longer time frame would have required me to omit many 
variables of interest.  The respective thirty years of data were grouped into six, 5-year 
                                                 
13 Alaska and Hawaii were omitted, as usual in studies of U.S. state economic growth.  Nebraska and 
Minnesota were also eliminated because the variables Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature 
could not be constructed for these two states over the full-time period:  In Nebraska, state representatives 
do not formally affiliate with political parties; whereas Minnesota had a unicameral state legislature 
through 1970. 
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periods.  (1970-1974, 1975-1979, …, 1995-1999).  Data for most of these variables were 
collected from original data sources.14   
 Using 5-year over annual data offers several advantages:  It (i) averages out 
“business cycle effects” (Grier and Tullock, 1989); (ii) minimizes errors from 
misspecifying lag effects; and (iii) reduces time-specification issues.  Time-specification 
issues arise because data can have different start and end periods within a given calendar 
year.  For example, state income data is defined over calendar years; state fiscal data is 
defined over fiscal years (which are different for different states); and other variables 
(e.g. employment, population data) may be measured at different points within the year 
(beginning/middle/end).  In addition, a number of variables (e.g., variables based on 
decennial Census data) require interpolation in order to get a balanced panel.  For all of 
these reasons, the use of 5-year data should entail fewer estimation problems.
 Following Equation (5), the general specification for the empirical models is15,16: 
(11)     ( ) t
p
t,pp
d
4t,dt,dd
l
4t,ll
t3t2t10
t
XXX X               
 
effects fixed time  effects fixed state
DLNNDLNLDLNK
DLNY
επδλ
ββββ
++−++

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
++
+++=
∑∑∑ −− , 
where 199919941989198419791974t ,,,,,= ; DLNYt, DLNKt, DLNLt, and DLNNt are the 
respective difference quantities from Equation (5) multiplied by 100 (to give percent); 
4t,lX −  is the value of the explanatory variable at the beginning of the five-year period 
                                                 
14 Appendix A presents statistical descriptions of all the variables used in this study. 
15  Note that because (i) the dependent variable is expressed in logs and (ii) the annual price deflator is only 
available for the nation as a whole, and not for individual states, inflationary effects are captured by the 
time period dummies.  Thus, there is no need to convert the dependent variable to real values.   
16 In the estimated specification of Equation (6), I do not impose the restriction that ( )1213 −+= βββ  for 
two reasons.  First, population growth could also be a factor included in Ct which, if true, would invalidate 
the restriction.  Second, as a practical matter, this restriction is consistently rejected below the 1-percent 
significance level in all of the top model specifications. 
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(“level” form); ( )4t,ddt XX −−  is the change in the explanatory variable over the five-year 
period (“difference” form); and 
5
XXXXX
X 5t,p4t,p3t,p2t,p1t,pt,p
−−−−− ++++=  is the 5-
year average over the period (t-5 to t-1) for the Political Control variables Democratic 
Legislature, Republican Legislature, and Democratic Governor.17   
 The 602  possible model specifications each include the variables listed in brackets 
in Equation (11) but allow for alternative configurations of the last three sets of variables 
( 4t,lX − , ( )4t,ddt XX −− , and t,pX ), since the theory is non-specific about which variables 
belong in tC  (cf. Equation [5]).   
 
VI.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps.  In the first step, I estimate a regression 
that uses the full set of regressors.  In the second step, I use model selection criteria to 
identify the best SIC and best AICc specifications among the 1860 1015.12 ×≅  total 
possible models.  These best models are then compared to the model with all variables.  
Finally, I identify separate SIC and AICc portfolios of “reasonable” models and perform 
EBA to identify which determinants of U.S. state economic growth are “robust.”18 
 Specification with All Variables.  TABLE 2 reports the results of estimating 
Equation (11) using the full set of explanatory variables.  Because the focus is on the 
TABLE 1 variables, I do not report estimates for DLNK, DLNL, and DLNN, nor state and 
time fixed effects (see Equation [11]).  However, I note that the estimated coefficients for 
                                                 
17 This last adjustment is made to account for the fact that it takes at least a year for political representation 
to get translated into legislation (cf. Poterba, 1994; Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995; Reed, 2006), and it is the 
latter that is assumed to matter for economic growth.   
18 The fact that theory determines which variables are “doubtful,” and that all possible combinations of 
“doubtful” variables are considered, should address concerns about subjective classification (McAleer et 
al., 1985). 
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DLNL, DLNK, and DLNN are each positive in sign and highly significant (p-value < 
0.0001).  Likewise, the state and time fixed effects are each jointly highly significant 
(again, p-values < 0.0001).   
 Variables are identified by number to facilitate reference to TABLE 1.  “D” and 
“L” indicate whether the specific variable is in “difference” or “level” form.  Only seven 
of the sixty coefficient estimates in TABLE 2 have t-ratios larger than 2.0:  three of these 
represent Population/Labor Force characteristics (Education-L, Working Population-D, 
and Female-D); two represent Economy characteristics (Agriculture-D and Mining-D); 
and two represent Public Sector (Policy) variables (Federal Revenue-L and Sales Tax-L).  
More will be said about specific coefficient estimates below, but for now I note that these 
results provide little evidence that public policy affects growth.   
 The most noteworthy result from TABLE 2, however, is the large number of 
insignificant coefficients.  Most researchers would consider a regression specification 
with 53 insignificant coefficients to be poorly specified.  But how many variables, and 
which ones, should be dropped?  Towards that end, I use the SIC and AICc selection 
criteria to select “best” models. 
 Best SIC and AICc Specifications.  TABLE 3 reports results from the best 
specifications as chosen by the SIC and the AICc model selection criteria.  In this case, 
best means that these specifications have the lowest SIC and AICc values out of the full 
set of approximately 181015.1 ×  possible specifications.   
 A comparison with TABLE 2 is illuminating.  The coefficient estimates are 
generally similar for the variables that appear in both tables.  Thus, at least in these cases, 
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changing the set of regressors does not have a large impact on the respective point 
estimates.  However, it does affect the significance of the coefficient estimates.   
 A total of thirteen variables are included in the Best SIC specification (where I 
count a variable as appearing once if it appears in both level and difference form); while 
fourteen are chosen using the AICc criterion.  All of these variables have t-statistics 
greater than 2.0.  Only seven variables from TABLE 2 had t-statistics greater than 2.0.   
 As a result, TABLE 3 presents a different picture about the determinants of U.S. 
state economic growth.  Most importantly, it suggests a larger role for public policy.  The 
variables Federal Government, Federal Employees, Decentralization, Tax Burden (in 
both level and difference forms), Sales Tax, and Corporate Income Tax each appear in 
both the Best SIC and Best AICc specifications.  What is not clear is how robust this 
latter picture is to “reasonable,” alternative model specifications.  
 Extreme Bounds Analysis.  Following EBA convention, I identify as “robust” any 
variable whose coefficient estimates are all same-signed and lie more than two standard 
deviations away from zero.  However, two features of my approach differ from standard 
EBA analysis:  (i) I analyze two “portfolios of models” (one for SIC, one for AICc), and 
(ii) not every variable appears in every specification within a given portfolio.  
Accordingly, I also require “robust” variables to appear in at least 50% of the 
specifications in either portfolio.   
 The SIC portfolio consists of twenty-seven different models, the Best SIC 
specification and twenty-six “close competitors” as defined by the 10<ℜ  criterion.  
The results from analyzing this portfolio of models are reported in TABLE 4A.  
Variables are ranked in descending order of number of appearances within the portfolio.  
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“Robust” variables are identified with an “R.”  A total of 18 different variables are 
analyzed in TABLE 4A.  Some, like Education, appear in all twenty-seven models.  
Others, like State & Local Employees and State & Local Government appear in only a 
very few models (though both have high t-ratios when they do appear).  Not surprisingly, 
there is a high overlap between (i) the set of variables that appears in at least 50% of the 
models in the SIC portfolio, and (ii) the set of variables having a range of t-ratios all 
same-signed and larger than 2.0.   
 TABLE 4B reports that fifty-seven models are included in the AICc portfolio.  A 
total of 23 different variables appear in at least one of these models.  However, many of 
these appear in only a few models and some, like Individual Income Tax and Higher 
Education Spending, appear only once.  
 TABLE 5 collects the “robust” variables from these extreme bounds analyses and 
reports them, along with a “mean estimated effect” calculated as the simple average of 
the respective means from TABLES 4A and 4B.  To interpret the respective sizes of these 
effects, recall that the dependent variable is the 5-year growth rate in state Per Capita 
Personal Income.  For my sample of 30 years (six, 5-year time periods) and 46 states 
(yielding 276 observations), the mean growth rate is 27.01 percent.  Thus, a one 
percentage point increase in the 5-year growth rate equates approximately to a 3.7 percent 
increase in growth. 
 Given the underlying theoretical model of Equation (5), the variables of TABLE 5 
should be related to the term, [ ] [ ])ln)ln)ln)ln L-ttL-tt (Q (Q (A (A C −+−= β .  Since At and 
Qt represent production function parameters, theory suggests that these variables affect 
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the rate of invention and adoption of new technologies that transform the production 
function over time.  This includes effects on resource allocation.   
 Difference variables are indicated by “D” and represent changes in that variable 
during the 5-year period.  Level variables are indicated by “L” and represent the value of 
that variable at the beginning of the 5-year period.  A variable that appears in both 
difference and level form has both an immediate and a lagged effect.  The difference 
form indicates the immediate effect, since changes during the 5-year period impact 
economic growth during that same period.  The level form indicates a lagged effect, since 
changes that get reflected at the beginning of the period show up later, in the subsequent 
5-year growth period. 
 TABLE 5 identifies three Population/Labor Force variables as “robust’ 
determinants of state economic growth:  Education, Working Population, and Female.  
All have the expected signs.  Education appears in level form.  The mean estimated effect 
indicates that a one percentage-point increase in the percent of the population that is 
college-educated at the beginning of a five-year period is associated with a 0.97 
percentage-point increase in that state’s subsequent 5-year growth rate.  This effect is 
relatively small in economic terms given that the average 5-year growth rate is 27.01 
percent.   
 The difference form of Working Population is also identified as a “robust” 
variable.  The corresponding estimated positive effect indicates that a one-percentage 
point increase in the share of the population that is aged 20-64 during a given 5-year 
period is associated with an approximate 0.90 percentage-point, contemporaneous 
increase in economic growth during that period.  Of course, one of the variables being 
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held constant in the estimation is employment (specifically, DLNL).  Thus, this variable 
likely reflects higher worker quality within the labor force.  Increases in the female share 
of a state’s population (Female) are also estimated to have a contemporaneous, albeit 
negative impact on economic growth.  Again, since employment is being held constant, 
this may reflect productivity differences between men and women in the labor force.   
 TABLE 5 identifies two Economy characteristic variables:  Agriculture and 
Mining.  The coefficient for Agriculture is positive in both level and difference forms, 
indicating that states with larger and growing agricultural sectors (as measured by 
earnings share) grew faster than other states.  The sources of increased agricultural 
productivity are debated, but lower input prices, public and private research, increased 
specialization and changes in farm size have all been identified as contributing factors 
(cf. Evenson and Huffman, 1997).  In contrast, the coefficients for Mining, which also 
appear in both difference and level forms, are each negative.  This is consistent with 
research that finds that the mining industry contributes negligibly, or even negatively, to 
aggregate TFP growth (cf. Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000). 
 TABLE 5 includes seven Public Sector variables:  Federal Government, Federal 
Employees, Federal Revenue, Decentralization, Tax Burden, Sales Tax, and Corporate 
Income Tax.  The first two variables measure the size of the federal government’s 
presence in a state, measured by earnings share and employment per capita, respectively.  
The corresponding coefficients for both variables indicate that a larger federal 
government sector is associated with lower economic growth, ceteris paribus.  This may 
be due to the fact that, relative to the private sector, resources in the public sector are less 
likely to be allocated to where they will produce income growth (cf. Barro, 1990).   
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 The mean estimated effect for the difference form of Federal Government 
indicates that a one percentage-point increase in this variable – corresponding to roughly 
a 15% increase in the size of the federal government sector over a 5-year period -- is 
associated with a contemporaneous 0.83 percentage-point decline in state economic 
growth.  The corresponding estimate for the level form of Federal Employees implies that 
doubling the number of federal employees per capita would lower the subsequent 5-year 
growth rate of that state by 4.48 percent.  While not “robust,” it is interesting to note that 
I estimate similar-sized effects for both State & Local Government and State & Local 
Employees (cf. TABLES 4A and 4B). 
 The variable Federal Revenue measures the size of federal aid to states.  The 
sample mean of Federal Revenue is 3.90.  A one percentage-point increase in this 
variable would represent approximately a 25% increase in federal aid.  The mean 
estimated effect reported in TABLE 5 for this variable indicates that an increase of this 
size would raise a state’s subsequent 5-year growth rate by 1.16 percentage-points.   
 The variable Decentralization measures the share of total state and local public 
spending made at the local level.  I estimate that a one-percentage point increase in the 
share of local control is associated with a contemporaneous decrease of 0.11 percentage 
points in a state’s 5-year growth rate.  Given that the sample mean of Decentralization is 
55.0 percentage-points, this constitutes a very small effect.  It is consistent with the fact 
that other studies have had difficulty finding significant effects for this variable (cf. Xie, 
Zou and Davoodi, 1999). 
 The remaining three variables are tax variables.  The negative coefficients for Tax 
Burden indicate that an increase in state tax revenues as a share of state personal income 
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(i.e., average tax rate) results in lower economic growth.  The fact that both level and 
difference forms of the variable are identified as “robust” determinants indicates that the 
effect of taxes is both immediate and persistent.  A one percentage-point increase in Tax 
Burden over a five-year period is associated with a contemporaneous decrease in state 
economic growth of 0.63 percentage points.  In addition, it is estimated to lower growth 
by 0.73 percentage points over subsequent 5-year periods.  As a gauge of size, a one-
percentage point increase in Tax Burden equates approximately to a 10% increase in 
overall taxes. 
 While not huge, these effects are larger than estimated by previous studies (cf. 
Wasylenko, 1997).  First, they imply both an immediate and long-lived effect of taxes.  
Second, the estimated effects represent the net effect of taxes and spending.  Previous 
studies, following Helms (1987), commonly estimated “government budget constraint” 
specifications, so that public expenditures were held constant.  The associated tax 
estimates did not incorporate the corresponding positive effects related to stimulative 
spending.  In contrast, my specifications do not hold constant the level of public 
expenditures, and thus represent significantly larger negative tax effects.   
 In contrast, the estimated coefficients for both Sales Tax and Corporate Income 
Tax are each positive.  Note that a one percentage-point increase in these variables 
represents approximate increases of 30% and 200%, respectively.  The positive effects 
for these two variables indicate that sales and corporate income taxes are less 
distortionary than other taxes, such as individual income and property taxes.  A further 
factor may be in play when it comes to business taxes in general, and corporate income 
taxes in particular:  Corporate profits may be more likely than other sources of income to 
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be exported outside the state.  Taxing corporate profits may serve to channel economic 
activity within the state, thus contributing to economic growth.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the determinants of U. S. state economic growth from 1970-1999.  
Using a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function framework, it considers a large 
number of potential explanatory variables, including Population/Labor Force 
characteristics, Economy characteristics, Public Sectory (Policy) variables, and Political 
Control variables.  Counting both difference and level forms, a total of 60 possible 
explanatory variables are considered, in addition to the capital, employment, and 
population variables specified by the theory.  This yields a total of 1860 1015.12 ×≅  
possible linear combinations of variables, each representing a potentially true model. 
 I devise an approach for sorting through these different model specifications in 
order to identify “robust” determinants of state economic growth.  My approach is related 
to the “reasonable extreme bounds analysis” of Granger and Uhlig (1990).  Unlike their 
study, however, I use information criteria (the Schwarz Information Criterion and the 
corrected version of the Akaike Information Criterion) to choose “portfolios of 
reasonable models,” as suggested by Poskitt and Tremayne (1987).  I then perform 
conventional extreme bounds analysis within these portfolios.  An advantage of my 
approach is that it uses standard SAS procedures and can be easily implemented by other 
researchers. 
 My analysis identifies twelve “robust” determinants of U.S. economic growth 
over the thirty-year period from 1970-1999.  Among these are (i) college attainment 
within the population, (ii) share of the population that is “working age,” (iii) population 
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gender share, and the size of the (iv) agricultural and (v) mining sectors of the economy.  
I also find that a relatively large number of public sector variables are significantly 
correlated with growth.  Among these are (vi and vii), the size of the federal sector within 
a state, (viii) federal aid, (ix) decentralization, and (x through xii) various categories of 
taxes.  This latter finding highlights the importance of public policy as a determinant of 
economic growth.  While one must be careful to draw causative inferences from these 
results, they provide further motivation to identify channels by which public policy 
directly impacts economic activity. 
  
 25
REFERENCES 
 
Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata.  “Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic 
Growth: Evidence From State-level Cross-section Data for the United States.” 
Journal of Urban Economics Vol. 52 (2002): 93-108. 
 
Alm, James and Janet Rogers.  “Do State Fiscal Policies Affect Economic Growth?”  
Mimeo, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
Georgia State University, 2005. 
 
Aschauer, David Alan.  “Is Public Expenditure Productive?”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics Vol. 23 (1989): 177-200. 
 
Barro, Robert J.  “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth.” 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (1990): S103-S125. 
 
Bartik, Timothy J.  Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?  
Kalamazoo, MI:  W.E. Upjohn Insitute for Employment Research, 1991. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case.  “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic 
Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Term Limits.”  Quarterly Journal 
of Economics Vol. 110, No. 3 (1995): 769-798. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case.  “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence 
From the United States.’  Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 41 (2003): 7-73. 
 
Burnham, Kenneth P. and David R. Anderson.  Model Selection and Multimodel 
Inference, 2nd Edition.  New York: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2002. 
 
Carroll, Robert and Michael Wasylenko.  “Do State Business Climates Still Matter? – 
Evidence of a Structural Change.”  National Tax Journal Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 
19-37. 
 
Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur John Coleman II.  “The U.S. Structural Transformation 
and Regional Convergence: A Reinterpretation.  Journal of Political Economy 
Vol. 109, No. 3 (2001): 584-616. 
 
Chatfield, Chris.  “Model Uncertainty, Data Mining, and Statistical Inference.”  Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol. 158, No. 3 (1995): 419-466. 
 
Ciccone, Antonio and Robert E. Hall.  “Productivity and the Density of Economic 
Activity.”  American Economic Review Vol. 86, No. 1 (1996): 54-70. 
 
Clark, David E. and Christopher A. Murphy.  “Countywide Employment and Population 
Growth: An Analysis of the 1980s.”  Journal of Regional Science Vol. 36, No. 2 
(1996): 235-256. 
 26
 
Crain, W. Mark and Katherine J. Lee.  “Economic Growth Regressions for the American 
States: A Sensitivity Analysis.” Economic Inquiry Vol. 37, No. 2 (1999): 242-
257. 
 
Crown, William H. and Leonard F. Wheat.  “State Per Capita Income Convergence Since 
1950: Sharecropping’s Demise and Other Influences.”  Journal of Regional 
Science Vol. 35, No. 4 (1995): 527-552. 
 
Dalenberg, Douglas R. and Mark D. Partridge.  “The Effects of Taxes, Expenditures, and 
Public Infrastructure on Metropolitan Area Employment.”  Journal of Regional 
Science Vol. 35, No. 4 (1995): 617-640. 
 
Demekas, Dimitri G., and Zenon G. Kontolemis.  “Government Employment and Wages 
and Labor Market Performance.”  Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
Vol. 62, No. 3 (2000):  
 
Evenson, Robert E. and Wallace B. Huffman.  “Long-Run Structural and Productivity 
Change in U.S. Agriculture: Effects of Prices and Policies.”  Mimeo, Yale 
University, Economic Growth Center, Center Discussion Paper No. 773, 1997. 
 
Fernández, Carmen, Eduardo Ley, and Mark F. J. Steel.  “Model Uncertainty in Cross-
Country Growth Regressions.”  Journal of Applied Econometrics Vol. 16 (2001): 
563-576. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C.  “The Effects of State and Local Public Services on Economic 
Development.”  New England Economic Review (1997), March/April): 53-67. 
 
Foster, Kathryn A.  “Exploring the Links Between Political Structure and Metropolitan 
Growth.” Political Geography Vol. 12, No. 6 (1993): 523-547. 
 
Furnival, G. M. and Robert W. J. Wilson.  “Regression By Leaps and Bounds.”  
Technometrics Vol. 16 (1974): 499-511. 
 
Garofalo, Gasper A. and Steven Yamarik.  “Regional Convergence: Evidence From a 
New State-by-State Capital Stock Series.”  The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 84, No. 2 (2002): 315-323. 
 
Garcia-Milà, Teresa, and Therese J. McGuire.  “The Contribution of Publicly Provided 
Inputs to States’ Economies.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics Vol. 22 
(1992): 229-241. 
 
Gelb, A., J. B. Knight, and R. H. Sabot.  “Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking, and 
Economic Growth.”  The Economic Journal Vol. 101, No. 408 (1991): 1186-
1199. 
 
 27
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Matsusaka, John G.  “Deviations from Constituent Interests: the 
Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States.”  Economic 
Inquiry Vol. 33 (1995): 383-401. 
 
Granger, Clive W. J. and Uhlig, Harald F.  “Reasonable Extreme-Bounds Analysis.”  
Journal of Econometrics Vol. 44, Nos. 1-2 (1990): 159-170. 
 
Grier, Kevin B. and Gordon Tullock.  “An Empirical Analysis of Cross-national 
Economic Growth, 1951-1980.” Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 24, No. 2 
91989): 169-328. 
 
Helms, Jay L.  “The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth: A Time 
Series-Cross Section Approach.”  The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 
67, No. 4 (1985): 574-582. 
 
Hendry, David F.  and Hans-Martin Krolzig.  “We Ran One Regression.”  Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics Vol. 66, No. 5 (2004): 799-810. 
 
Hirsch, Barry T., David A. MacPherson, and Wayne G. Vroman.  “Estimates of Union 
Density by State.”  Monthly Labor Review Vol. 124, No. 7 (2001): 51-55. 
 
Hoeting, Jennifer A., David Madigan, Adrian E. Raftery, and Chris T. Volinsky.  
“Bayesian Model Averaging: A Tutorial.”  Statistical Science Vol. 14, No. 4 
(1999): 382-417. 
 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas.  “Solow and the States: Capital Accumulation, Productivity, and 
Economic Growth.”  National Tax Journal Vol. 46, No. 4 (1993): 425-440 
 
Hoover, Kevin D. and Stephen J. Perez, “Truth and Robustness in Cross-country Growth 
Regressions.”  Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics Vol. 66, No. 5 (2004): 
765-798. 
 
Hurvich, C. M. and C. L. Tsai.  “Regression and Time Series Model Selection in Small 
Samples.”  Biometrika, Vol. 76 (1989): 297-307. 
 
Jeffreys, H.  The Theory of Probability, 3rd Edition.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
 
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Kevin J. Stiroh.  “Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic 
Growth in the Information Age.”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1 
(2000): 125-211.  
 
Leamer, Edward E.  “Sensitivity Analyses Would Help.”  American Economic Review 
Vol. 75 (1985): 308-13. 
 
Lee, Young and Roger H. Gordon.  “Tax Structure and Economic Growth.”  Journal of 
Public Economics Vol. 89 (2005): 1027-1043. 
 28
 
Levine, Ross and David Renelt.  “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions.” American Economic Review Vol. 82, No. 4 (1992): 942-963. 
 
Levitt, Steven D. and James M. Poterba.  “Congressional Distributive Politics and State 
Economic Performance.”  Public Choice Vol. 99 (1999): 185-216. 
 
McQuarrie, Allan D. R. and Chih-Ling Tsai.  Regression and Time Series Model 
Selection.  Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 1998. 
 
McAleer, Michael, Adrian R. Pagan, and Paul A. Volker.  “What Will Take the Con Out 
of Econometrics?”  American Economic Review Vol. 75, No. 3 (1985): 293-307. 
 
McGuire, Therese.  “Review of ‘Who Benefits From State and Local Economic 
Development Policies?’” National Tax Journal, Vol. XLV, No. 4 (1992): 457-
459. 
 
Miller, A. J.  Subset Selection in Regression.  London, Chapman and Hall, 1990. 
 
Mitchener, Kris James and Ian W. McLean.  “The Productivity of U.S. States Since 
1880.”  Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, (2003): 73-114. 
 
Mofidi, Alaeddin and Joe A. Stone.  “Do State and Local Taxes Affect Economic 
Growth?”  Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 72, No. 4 (1990): 686-691. 
 
Mullen, John K. and Martin Williams.  “Marginal Tax Rates and State Economic 
Growth.” Regional Science and Urban Economics Vol. 24 (1994): 687-705. 
 
Nelson, Arthur C. and Kathryn A. Foster.  “Metropolitan Governance Structure and 
Income Growth.” Journal of Urban Affairs Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999):309-324. 
 
Partridge, Mark D. and Dan S. Rickman.  “The Role of Industry Structure, Costs, and 
Economic Spillovers in Determining State Employment Growth Rates.”  Review 
of Regional Studies Vol. 26, No. 3 (1996): 235-64. 
 
Phillips, Joseph and Ernest Goss.  “The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic 
Development: A Meta-Analysis.” Southern Economic Journal 62 (1995): 320-
333. 
 
Plaut, Thomas R. and Joseph E. Pluta.  “Business Climate, Taxes and Expenditures, and 
State Industrial Growth in the United States.”  Southern Economic Journal Vol. 
50 (1983): 99-109. 
 
Poskitt, D. S., and A. R. Tremayne.  “Determining a Portfolio of Time Series Models.”  
Biometrika Vol. 74, No. 1 (1987): 125-137. 
 
 29
Poterba, James M.  “States’ Responses to Fiscal Crises:  The Effects of Budgetary 
Institutions and Politics.”  Journal of Political Economy Vol. 102 (1994): 799-
821. 
 
Reed, W. Robert.  “Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence that Political Parties 
Matter.”  Journal of Public Economics  (2006): Forthcoming. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X.  “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions.” American Economic 
Review Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997): 178-183. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, Gernot Doppelhofer, and Ronald I. Miller, “Determinants of Long-
Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach.”  
American Economic Review Vol. 94, No. 4 (2004): 813-835. 
 
SAS Institute Inc.  SAS/STAT 9.1 User’s Guide.  Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc., 2004. 
 
Stansel, Dean.  “Local Decentralization and Local Economic Growth: A Cross-sectional 
Examination of U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Journal of Urban Economics Vol. 57 
(2005): 55-72. 
 
Sugiura, N.  “Further Analysis of the Data By Akaike’s Information Criterion and the 
Finite Corrections.”  Communications in Statistics – Theory and Methods, Vol. 7 
(1978): 13-26. 
 
van der Ploeg, Frederick.  “Rolling Back the Public Sector – Differential Effects on 
Employment, Investment and Growth.” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 890.  
Working paper, March, 2003. 
 
Wasylenko, Michael and Therese McGuire.  “Jobs and Taxes: The Effect of Business 
Climate on State Employment Growth Rates.”  National Tax Journal Vol. 38, No. 
4 (1985): 497-511. 
 
Xie, Danyang, Heng-fu Zou, and Hamid Davoodi.  “Fiscal Decentralization and 
Economic Growth in the United States.”  Journal of Urban Economics Vol. 45 
(1999): 228-239. 
 
Yamarik, Steven.  “Can Tax Policy Help Explain State-level Macroeconomic Growth?” 
Economics Letters Vol. 68 (2000): 211-215. 
 
Zellner, A.  “Comments on Time Series Analysis and Causal Concepts in Business Cycle 
Research.”  In New Methods in Business Cycle Research, ed. C. A. Sims.  
Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1977. 
 
 30
TABLE 1:  List of Potential Determinants of U.S. State Economic Growth19 
 
NUMBER NAME DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED 
THIS OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
A) Population/Labor Force Characteristics 
1 Education Percent of population (aged 25 and up) who have completed college (SOURCE: Census) 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire (1992); Crown and Wheat (1995); 
Phillips and Goss (1995); Dalenberg and 
Partridge (1995); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Clark and Murphy (1996); Ciccone and Barro 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
2 Working Population 
Percent of population between 20 and 64 years 
of age (SOURCE: Census) 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Mofidi and 
Stone (1990); Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); 
Crain and Lee (1999) 
3 Nonwhite Percent of population that is nonwhite (SOURCE: Census) 
Mofidi and Stone (1990); Partridge and Rickman 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
4 Female Percent of population that is female (SOURCE: Census) 
Mofidi and Stone (1990); Partridge and Rickman 
(1996); Clark and Murphy (1996) 
5 Population Log of total population (SOURCE: Census) Ciccone and Barro (1996); Alm and Rogers (2005) 
B) Economy Characteristics 
6 
 
Population Density 
 
Population density (SOURCE: Census) 
 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985); Carroll and 
Wasyenko (1994); Clark and Murphy (1996); 
Ciccone and Hall (1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
 
                                                 
19 Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix A. 
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NUMBER NAME DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED 
THIS OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
7 Urban Percent of population living in urban areas (SOURCE: Census) 
Holtz-Eakin (1993); Partridge and Rickman 
(1996); Crain and Lee (1999) 
8 Agriculture 
Share of total earnings earned in “Farm” and 
“Other Agriculture” industries (SOURCE: 
BEA) 
Crown and Wheat (1995); Caselli and Coleman 
(2001) 
9 Manufacturing Share of total earnings earned in “Manufacturing” industries (SOURCE: BEA) 
Crown and Wheat (1995); Crain and Lee (1999); 
Caselli and Coleman (2001); Stansel (2005) 
10 Service Share of total earnings earned in “Service” industries (SOURCE: BEA) Clark and Murphy (1996) 
11 Mining Share of total earnings earned in “Mining” industries (SOURCE: BEA) 
Holtz-Eakin (1993); Crown and Wheat (1995); 
Clark and Murphy (1996); Mitchener and 
McLean (2003) 
12 Union 
Percent of nonagricultural wage and salary 
employees who are union members (SOURCE: 
Hirsch, McPherson, and Vroman, 2001) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Mofidi and Stone (1990); 
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Phillips and 
Goss (1995); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Clark and Murphy (1996) 
13 Diversity 
A measure of industrial diversity, 
2
i
i
Earnings Total 
Industry in Earnings
Diversity ∑ 

=  
(SOURCE: BEA) 
Mofidi and Stone (1990); Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire (1992); Partridge and Rickman (1996); 
Crain and Lee (1999) 
 
C1) Public Sector: Size and Structure Variables 
 
14 
Federal 
Government 
 
Share of total earnings earned in “Federal 
government” (SOURCE: BEA) 
 
Crain and Lee (1999) 
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NUMBER NAME DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED 
THIS OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
15 State & Local Government 
Share of total earnings earned in “State and 
Local government” (SOURCE: BEA) Crain and Lee (1999) 
16 Federal Employees Log of federal employees per capita (SOURCE: Census) 
Gelb, Knight and Sabot (1991); Demekas and 
Kontolemis (2000); van der Ploeg (2003) 
17 State & Local Employees 
Log of state and local employees per capita 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Gelb, Knight and Sabot (1991); Demekas and 
Kontolemis (2000); van der Ploeg (2003) 
18 Federal Revenue 
Intergovernmental revenue received by state 
and local governments from the federal 
government as a share of personal income 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Carroll and Wasylenko (1994); Dalenberg and 
Partridge (1995); Xie, Zou, and Davoodi (1999); 
Akai and Sakata (2002) 
19 Decentralization 
Share of total state and local direct general 
expenditures made by local governments 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Clark and Murphy (1996); Xie, Zou, and Davoodi 
(1999); Crain and Lee (1999); Akai and Sakata 
(2002) 
20 Number of Governments 
Number of state and local governments 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Foster (1993); Nelson and Foster (1999); Stansel 
(2005) 
 
C2) Public Sector: Tax Variables 
 
21 Tax Burden Total state and local tax revenues as a share of personal income (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Mullen and Williams 
(1994); Partridge and Rickman (1996); Xie, Zou, 
and Davoodi (1999); Yamarik (2000) 
22 Property Tax Total state and local property tax revenues as a share of personal income (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Helms (1985); Carroll and 
Wasylenko (1994); Yamarik (2000) 
23 Sales Tax Total state sales tax revenues as a share of personal income (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Wasylenko and McGuire 
(1985); Yamarik (2000) 
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NUMBER NAME DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED 
THIS OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
24 Individual Income Tax 
Total state individual income tax revenues as a 
share of personal income (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Wasylenko and McGuire 
(1985); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994); Yamarik 
(2000) 
25 Corporate Income Tax 
Total state corporate income tax revenues as a 
share of personal income (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Wasylenko and McGuire 
(1985); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) 
 
C3) Public Sector: Expenditure Variables 
26 Local Education Spending 
Total state and local spending on local schools 
as a share of total state and local expenditures 
(SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Helms (1985); Wasylenko 
and McGuire (1985); Ashauer (1989); Mofidi and 
Stone (1990); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994); 
Fisher (1997) 
27 Higher Education Spending 
Total state and local spending on higher 
education as a share of total state and local 
expenditures (SOURCE: Census) 
Plaut and Pluta (1983); Helms (1985); Wasylenko 
and McGuire (1985); Aschauer (1989); Mofidi 
and Stone (1990); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994); 
Dalenberg and Partridge (1995); Fisher (1997) 
28 Health & Hospital Spending 
Total state and local spending on health and 
hospitals as a share of total state and local 
expenditures (SOURCE: Census) 
Helms (1985); Ashauer (1989); Mofidi and Stone 
(1990); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) 
29 Highway Spending 
Total state and local direct spending on 
highways as a share of total state and local 
expenditures (SOURCE: Census) 
Helms (1985); Ashauer (1989); Mofidi and Stone 
(1990); Carroll and Wasylenko (1994); Dalenberg 
and Partridge (1995); Fisher (1997) 
 
D) Political Control Variables 
30 Democratic Legislature 
Percent of years that both houses of the state 
legislature were controlled by Democrats 
(SOURCE: National Conference of State 
Legislatures) 
Levitt and Poterba (1997); Akai and Sakata 
(2002); Besley and Case (2003); Reed (2006) 
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NUMBER NAME DESCRIPTION (ALL VARIABLES CALCULATED AS 5-YEAR AVERAGES) 
SELECTED STUDIES WHICH HAVE USED 
THIS OR A RELATED VARIABLE 
31 Republican Legislature 
Percent of years that both houses of the state 
legislature were controlled by Republicans 
(SOURCE: National Conference of State 
Legislatures) 
Levitt and Poterba (1997); Akai and Sakata 
(2002); Besley and Case (2003); Reed (2006) 
32 Democratic Governor 
Percent of years that governor was a Democrat 
(SOURCE: National Conference of State 
Legislatures) 
Levitt and Poterba (1997); Akai and Sakata 
(2002); Besley and Case (1995, 2003); Reed 
(2006) 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Results Using All Variables 
 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT (t-STAT) VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT 
(t-STAT) 
D 0.9883 (1.22) D 
-0.4118 
(0.08) 
Education(1) 
L 1.1431  (4.38) 
State & Local 
Employees(17) 
L -3.9735 (0.77) 
D 1.0171 (2.22) D 
-0.1147 
(0.29) 
Working Population(2) 
L 0.1705 (0.58) 
Federal Revenue(18) 
L 0.9760  (2.15) 
D 0.5852 (0.98) D 
-0.1199 
(1.31) 
Nonwhite(3) 
L 0.0510 (0.24) 
Decentralization(19) 
L 0.0545 (0.52) 
D -4.3025 (2.37) D 
-2.7378 
(0.91) 
Female(4) 
L 1.5506 (1.58) 
Number of 
Governments(20) 
L 0.3560 (0.17) 
Population(5) L 5.5970 (1.51) D 
-0.3484 
(0.72) 
D 0.0214 (0.42) 
Tax Burden(21) 
L -0.8502 (1.57) 
Population Density(6) 
L 0.0026 (0.18) D 
-0.1257 
(0.19) 
D -0.1832 (1.01) 
Property Tax(22) 
L 0.6128 (0.89) 
Urban(7) 
L -0.0916 (0.80) D 
0.3490 
(0.90) 
D 0.4781  (2.95) 
Sales Tax(23) 
L 1.4607  (2.76) 
Agriculture(8) 
L 0.0886 (0.58)    
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VARIABLE COEFFICIENT (t-STAT) VARIABLE 
COEFFICIENT 
(t-STAT) 
D -0.3079 (1.56) D 
0.0514 
(0.07) 
Manufacturing(9) 
L 0.0137 (0.08) 
Individual Income 
Tax(24) 
L 0.8677 (1.24) 
D -0.2831 (1.08) D 
-1.3218 
(1.01) 
Service(10) 
L -0.2358 (0.92) 
Corporate Income 
Tax(25) 
L 2.1011 (1.44) 
D -1.4230  (4.36) D 
0.0392 
(0.30) 
Mining(11) 
L -0.5063 (1.92) 
Local Education 
Spending(26) 
L -0.0154 (0.10) 
D 0.0112 (0.13) D 
-0.0928 
(0.48) 
Union(12) 
L -0.0917 (1.00) 
Higher Education 
Spending(27) 
L -0.0684 (0.37) 
D 0.4697 (1.81) D 
0.2375 
(1.52) 
Diversity(13) 
L -0.1376 (0.49) 
Health & Hospital 
Spending(28) 
L 0.1968 (1.30) 
D -0.6316 (1.92) D 
0.1173 
(0.95) 
Federal Government(14) 
L 0.3208 (0.89) 
Highway Spending(29) 
L 0.1340 (0.92) 
D -0.5449 (1.36) Democratic Legislature(30) 
0.0073 
(1.17) State & Local 
Government(15) 
L -0.2488 (0.61) Republican Legislature(31) 
-0.0033 
(0.50) 
D -0.0719 (0.04) Democratic Governor(32) 
0.0033 
(0.87) 
Federal Employees(16) 
L -4.5456 (1.95)   
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Observations: 276 (= 46 states ×  6 time periods) R2 = 0.984 
SIC = 778.156 AICc = 804.288 
 
NOTE:  The regression equation is specified according to Equation (11) in the text and includes 
all possible variables.  Variables are defined in TABLE 1.  “D” and “L” stand for difference 
and level forms of the variables.  In addition to the variables listed above, the model includes the 
variable DLNK, DLNL, DLNN, and state and time fixed effects.  t-statistics are listed in 
parenthesis below each estimated coefficient. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression Results from Best SIC and Best AICc Specifications 
 
Variable 
Number 
Variable 
Name20 D/L
Best SIC 
Specification 
Best AICc 
Specification 
D --- 1.3994 (2.20) 
1 Education 
L 1.0353 (6.47) 
0.9514 
(6.84) 
2 Working Population D 
0.9378 
(2.88) 
0.7838 
(2.36) 
4 Female D -5.8832 (4.54) 
-5.8083 
(4.28) 
5 Population L --- 4.2579 (2.47) 
D 0.7486 (8.06) 
0.7096 
(7.82) 
8 Agriculture 
L 0.3082 (4.60) 
0.2808 
(4.20) 
10 Service L -0.3157 (2.31) --- 
D -1.1293 (4.65) 
-1.1300 
(4.66) 
11 Mining 
L -0.5044 (2.91) 
-0.3595 
(2.21) 
14 Federal Government D 
-0.8684 
(3.96) 
-0.7497 
(3.40) 
16 Federal Employees L 
-5.8371 
(4.26) 
-3.8148 
(2.45) 
18 Federal revenue L 1.1723 (4.17) 
1.0943 
(3.91) 
19 Decentralization D -0.1087 (2.21) 
-0.1111 
(2.29) 
                                                 
20 Variables are described in TABLE 1. 
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Variable 
Number 
Variable 
Name20 D/L
Best SIC 
Specification 
Best AICc 
Specification 
D -0.6333 (3.32) 
-0.7136 
(3.84) 
21 Tax Burden 
L -0.7405 (3.43) 
-0.7643 
(3.59) 
23 Sales Tax L 1.2511 (4.46) 
1.1083 
(3.94) 
25 Corporate Income Tax L 
2.5037 
(2.81) 
2.4220 
(2.76) 
30 Democratic Legislature --  
0.0113 
(2.23) 
Number of observations 276 276 
R2 0.9806 0.9813 
SIC 592.026 592.928 
AICc 663.086 660.043 
 
NOTE:  The regression equation follows the general specification of Equation (11) in the text.  
Variables are defined in TABLE 1.  “D” and “L” stand for difference and level forms of the 
variables.  In addition to the variables listed above, the model includes the variables DLNK, 
DLNL, DLNN, and state and time fixed effects.  t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below each 
estimated coefficient. The algorithm for determining the best specifications in described in 
Section IV. 
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TABLE 4A 
Extreme Bounds Analysis for Portfolio of Top SIC Models 
 
RANGE OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES RANGE OF t-RATIOS NUMBER 
(PERCENT) ROBUST VARIABLE D/L LOW MEAN HIGH LOW MEAN HIGH 
27(100%) R Education(1) L 0.7100 0.9477 1.0932 5.16 6.38 6.85 
27(100%) R Female(4) D -6.9309 -6.1086 -5.4376 4.10 4.61 5.30 
27(100%) R Agriculture(8) D 0.6360 0.7127 0.7693 6.21 7.57 8.25 
27(100%) R Agriculture(8) L 0.2440 0.3071 0.3582 3.48 4.57 5.37 
27(100%) R Mining(11) D -1.2974 -1.1395 -0.9005 4.07 4.72 5.38 
27(100%) R Federal Government(14) D -1.0244 -0.8805 -0.7497 3.39 4.00 4.74 
27(100%) R Federal Employees(16) L -6.1410 -5.0072 -3.6200 2.31 3.48 4.46 
27(100%) R Federal Revenue(18) L 0.9085 1.1573 1.3387 3.24 4.02 4.52 
27(100%) R Sales Tax(23) L 0.9990 1.1636 1.2911 3.58 4.11 4.59 
27(100%) R Corporate Income Tax(24) L 2.2712 2.5939 3.3821 2.56 2.91 3.79 
24(89%) -- Working Population(2) D 0.6515 0.9055 1.1352 1.97 2.78 3.37 
24(89%) R Mining(11) L -0.7136 -0.4670 -0.3440 2.10 2.79 4.18 
24(89%) R Tax Burden(21) D -0.8223 -0.6639 -0.5053 2.56 3.51 4.55 
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RANGE OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES RANGE OF t-RATIOS NUMBER 
(PERCENT) ROBUST VARIABLE D/L LOW MEAN HIGH LOW MEAN HIGH 
24(89%) R Tax Burden(21) L -0.9129 -0.7467 -0.6449 2.98 3.48 4.48 
14(52%) R Decentralization(19) D -0.1321 -0.1112 -0.1012 2.07 2.27 2.68 
11(41%) -- Population(5) L 3.2958 3.9428 4.5846 1.90 2.27 2.64 
11(41%) -- Service(10) L -0.4862 -0.3454 -0.2757 1.96 2.53 3.54 
8(30%) -- Education(1) D 1.1661 1.4657 1.7840 1.84 2.31 2.84 
7(26%) -- State & Local Government(15) D -0.9016 -0.6049 -0.4388 1.75 2.40 3.39 
7(26%) -- Decentralization(19) L 0.1020 0.1285 0.1422 1.90 2.44 2.71 
6(22%) -- Democratic Legislature(30) - 0.0095 0.0110 0.0128 1.88 2.16 2.53 
3(11%) -- Health & Hospital Spending(28) D 0.1894 0.2226 0.2588 1.63 1.91 2.23 
2(7%) -- State & Local Employees(17) L -7.2722 -7.1917 -7.1113 2.53 2.54 2.56 
1(4%) -- State & Local Government(15) L -0.6068 -0.6068 -0.6068 2.50 2.50 2.50 
 
NOTE:  The algorithm for calculating “extreme bounds” is described in Section IV of the text. 
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TABLE 4B 
Extreme Bounds Analysis for Portfolio of Top AICc Models 
 
RANGE OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES RANGE OF t-RATIOS NUMBER 
(PERCENT) ROBUST VARIABLE D/L LOW MEAN HIGH LOW MEAN HIGH 
57(100%) R Education(1) L 0.8354 0.9912 1.1365 5.74 6.42 7.06 
57(100%) R Working Population(2) D 0.6760 0.8864 1.0386 2.04 2.70 3.23 
57(100%) R Female(4) D -6.7496 -5.6811 -4.4992 3.26 4.21 5.13 
57(100%) R Agriculture(8) D 0.4968 0.6754 0.7602 4.02 7.01 8.21 
57(100%) R Agriculture(8) L 0.1783 0.2590 0.3071 2.40 3.80 4.58 
57(100%) R Mining(11) D -1.3193 -1.1687 -1.0655 4.32 4.79 5.27 
57(100%) -- Mining(11) L -0.5221 -0.4173 -0.2859 1.74 2.46 3.03 
57(100%) R Federal Government(14) D -0.9425 -0.7731 -0.6711 3.02 3.51 4.15 
57(100%) R Federal Employees(16) L -5.7203 -3.9538 -3.4240 2.21 2.54 4.21 
57(100%) R Federal Revenue(18) L 0.9514 1.1672 1.3310 3.37 4.08 4.61 
57(100%) R Tax Burden(21) D -0.7492 -0.6030 -0.4535 2.32 3.16 3.98 
57(100%) R Tax Burden(21) L -0.8272 -0.7222 -0.6386 2.96 3.37 3.88 
57(100%) R Sales Tax(23) L 0.9668 1.0802 1.1669 3.36 3.81 4.13 
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RANGE OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES RANGE OF t-RATIOS NUMBER 
(PERCENT) ROBUST VARIABLE D/L LOW MEAN HIGH LOW MEAN HIGH 
56(98%) -- Population(5) L 3.1220 4.0412 5.0292 1.81 2.31 2.83 
55(96%) -- Decentralization(19) D -0.1284 -0.1093 -0.0959 1.96 2.25 2.64 
52(91%) R Corporate Income Tax(25) L 2.0656 2.4037 2.9069 2.31 2.72 3.26 
37(65%) -- Democratic Legislature(30) - 0.0067 0.0103 0.0127 1.33 2.02 2.52 
34(60%) -- Education(1) D 0.9103 1.2891 1.4924 1.43 2.02 2.33 
34(60%) -- Service(10) L -0.3761 -0.2798 -0.1997 1.44 2.03 2.62 
26(46%) -- State & Local Government(15) D -0.6745 -0.4750 -0.3118 1.23 1.87 2.56 
17(30%) -- Diversity(13) D 0.1820 0.3384 0.4565 1.14 1.93 2.48 
17(30%) -- Health & Hospital Spending(28) D 0.1544 0.1830 0.2297 1.34 1.58 1.87 
13(23%) -- Manufacturing(9) D -0.3544 -0.2642 -0.2211 1.72 1.96 2.36 
13(23%) -- Union(12) L -0.1085 -0.0887 -0.0571 1.05 1.60 1.94 
8(14%) -- Diversity(13) L -0.3253 -0.2776 -0.2003 1.25 1.74 2.05 
5(9%) -- Corporate Income Tax(25) D -2.6637 -2.4655 -2.2580 2.51 2.72 2.92 
4(7%) -- Union(12) D 0.0667 0.0745 0.0853 1.17 1.31 1.51 
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RANGE OF COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES RANGE OF t-RATIOS NUMBER 
(PERCENT) ROBUST VARIABLE D/L LOW MEAN HIGH LOW MEAN HIGH 
3(5%) -- Democratic Governor(32) - 0.0039 0.0046 0.0049 1.19 1.42 1.54 
2(4%) -- Decentralization(19) L 0.1065 0.1105 0.1146 1.99 2.06 2.14 
1(2%) -- Female(4) L 0.8031 0.8031 0.8031 1.09 1.09 1.09 
1(2%) -- Service(10) D -0.2989 -0.2989 -0.2989 1.47 1.47 1.47 
1(2%) -- Individual Income Tax(24) L 0.5450 0.5450 0.5450 1.39 1.39 1.39 
1(2%) -- Higher Education Spending(27) D -0.1359 -0.1359 -0.1359 1.16 1.16 1.16 
1(2%) -- Health & Hospital Spending(28) L 0.1557 0.1557 0.1557 1.41 1.41 1.41 
 
 
NOTE:  The algorithm for calculating “extreme bounds” is described in Section IV of the text. 
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TABLE 5 
“Robust” Variables and Mean Estimated Effects 
 
VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
NUMBER NAME MEAN ESTIMATED EFFECT 
    
1 Education-L 0.97 
2 Working Population-D 0.90 Population/Labor Force characteristics 
4 Female-D -5.89 
    
8 Agriculture-D 0.69 
8 Agriculture-L 0.28 
11 Mining-D -1.15 Economy characteristics 
11 Mining-L -0.44 
    
14 Federal Government-D -0.83 
16 Federal Employees-L -4.48 
18 Federal Revenue-L 1.16 
19 Decentralization-D -0.11 
21 Tax Burden-D -0.63 
21 Tax Burden-L -0.73 
23 Sales Tax-L 1.12 
Public Sector (Policy) variables 
24 Corporate Income Tax-L 1.39 
    
 
NOTE:  “Mean Estimated Effect” is the simple average of the “Mean” coefficient estimates in TABLES 4A and 4B. 
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APPENDIX 
 Statistical Summary of Data 
 
Number Name21 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dep. 
Variable 
5-Year Growth 
Rate in PCPI  27.01 10.30 6.49 64.40 
D 1.76 0.55 0.34 3.21 
1 Education 
L 16.39 4.95 6.66 30.21 
D 0.97 0.92 -1.22 2.93 
2 Working Population L 55.89 3.18 47.54 62.26 
D 0.55 0.52 -0.98 2.42 
3 Nonwhite 
L 12.08 8.79 0.36 37.35 
D -0.02 0.15 -0.57 0.75 
4 Female 
L 51.24 0.79 48.77 52.76 
5 Population L 14.93 1.01 12.72 17.27 
D 5.09 6.77 -8.44 37.26 
6 Population Density L 167.72 234.21 3.44 1089.83 
D 0.75 1.15 -1.97 3.96 
7 Urban 
L 67.23 14.73 32.16 93.54 
D -0.04 2.42 -16.72 18.85 
8 Agriculture 
L 3.12 3.88 -8.92 29.06 
D -0.84 1.69 -6.09 3.37 
9 Manufacturing 
L 21.03 8.54 3.73 40.49 
D 1.47 1.27 -3.22 6.40 
10 Service 
L 19.56 5.71 10.93 41.55 
D -0.19 0.77 -3.29 4.27 
11 Mining 
L 2.21 3.60 0.02 24.98 
D -1.47 2.39 -10.6 5.0 
12 Union 
L 18.42 8.18 3.3 41.7 
D -0.06 0.78 -5.42 4.66 
13 Diversity 
L 17.44 2.05 13.84 23.56 
D -0.57 0.82 -5.98 1.25 
14 Federal Government L 7.02 3.63 2.05 23.45 
                                                 
21 Variables are described in TABLE 1. 
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Number Name21 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
D -0.10 0.88 -3.98 5.02 
15 State & Local Government L 11.98 1.66 8.47 18.40 
D -0.04 0.09 -0.67 0.37 
16 Federal Employees L 4.70 0.38 3.99 5.93 
D 0.03 0.06 -0.13 0.19 
17 State & Local Employees L 6.20 0.13 5.86 6.66 
D 0.10 0.77 -1.74 2.50 
18 Federal Revenue 
L 3.90 1.22 1.67 8.31 
D -0.13 2.54 -10.37 6.35 
19 Decentralization 
L 55.00 7.88 34.81 76.80 
D -0.02 0.07 -0.36 0.40 
20 Number of Governments L 5.90 0.88 4.26 8.40 
D 0.12 0.88 -5.52 5.91 
21 Tax Burden 
L 10.84 1.37 7.92 19.27 
D -0.09 0.56 -2.97 3.21 
22 Property Tax 
L 3.51 1.34 1.09 8.23 
D -0.03 1.02 -3.55 2.92 
23 Sales Tax 
L 3.31 1.18 0.69 6.92 
D 0.19 0.29 -0.73 1.82 
24 Individual Income Tax L 1.65 1.09 0 4.23 
D 0.01 0.14 -0.50 0.81 
25 Corporate Income Tax L 0.46 0.25 0 1.18 
D -0.67 1.93 -7.51 4.38 
26 Local Education Spending L 25.66 3.06 18.34 35.37 
D -0.22 1.02 -4.65 2.89 
27 
Higher 
Education 
Spending L 10.34 2.69 4.22 18.45 
D 0.25 1.13 -3.44 4.00 
28 
Health & 
Hospital 
Spending L 8.14 2.88 2.46 18.37 
D -1.21 1.74 -9.24 3.11 
29 Highway Spending L 10.96 4.04 4.27 25.59 
30 Democratic Legislature -- 55.0 46.2 0 100 
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Number Name21 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
31 Republican Legislature -- 24.9 39.0 0 100 
32 Democratic Governor -- 55.94 40.91 0 100 
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APPENDIX B 
SAS Program for determining M Best Specifications  
According to Both SIC and AICc Criteria 
 
 
data new1 ; 
set ying.data4; 
if code ne 27; ***This eliminates Nebraska; 
if code ne 31; ***This eliminates Minnesota; 
 
proc reg outest = new1 noprint; 
model dlny = dlnk dlnl dlnn s2-s20 s22-s24 s26-s48 t2-t6 
   D_PCTCOLBR PCTCOLBR D_PCTMIDBR PCTMIDBR D_PCTNONBR PCTNONBR  
   D_PCTFEMBR PCTFEMBR LNNBR D_DENSITY DENSBR 
   D_PCTURBBR PCTURBBR D_PCTAGBR PCTAGBR D_PCTMANBR PCTMANBR  
   D_PCTSERBR PCTSERBR D_PCTMIIBR PCTMIIBR D_PCTUNIBR PCTUNIBR  
   D_DIVERSBR DIVERSBR D_PCTFGOBR PCTFGOBR D_PCTSLGBR PCTSLGBR 
   D_FEMPPCBR FEMPPCBR D_SLEMPPBR SLEMPPBR D_PCTFREBR PCTFREBR  
   D_DECENTBR DECENTBR D_GOVSPCBR GOVSPCBR D_TXBRDNBR TXBRDNBR  
   D_PTXRATBR PTXRATBR D_STXRATBR STXRATBR D_IITAXRBR IITAXRBR  
   D_CITAXRBR CITAXRBR D_LEDUCSBR LEDUCSBR D_HEDUCSBR HEDUCSBR  
   D_HHOSPSBR HHOSPSBR D_HIWAYSBR HIWAYSBR  
   LEGDEMBR LEGREPBR GOVDEMBR 
    /  
   include = 53 
   selection = rsquare adjrsq aic sbc 
   best = 1000; 
 
**** This program sets the number of “best” specifications 
**** (M) equal to 1000 ;                                           ; 
 
 
data new2 ; 
set new1; 
SSE = ((_RMSE_)**2)*_EDF_ ; 
AIC = 276*log(SSE/276) + 2*_P_ ;  
SIC = 276*log(SSE/276) + (_P_ * log(276)); 
AICc= 276*(log(SSE/276) + ((276+ _P_ -1)/(276- _P_ -1))); 
 
proc sort data=new2 out=new3; 
   by SIC ; 
 
data new3a; 
set new3; 
if _N_ le 1000; 
 
data new3b; 
set new3a; 
if _N_ eq 1; 
SICstar=SIC; 
do i=1 to 1000; 
output; 
end; 
keep SICstar; 
 
data ying.bestsic46; 
merge new3a new3b; 
R=exp(-(1/2)*(SICstar-SIC)); 
if R < sqrt(10); 
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**** It is necessary that M (i.e., 1000) be larger than the number 
**** of models that satisfy the R < sqrt(10) criterion;  
 
proc sort data=new2 out=new4; 
   by AICc ; 
 
data new4a; 
set new4; 
if _N_ le 1000; 
 
data new4b; 
set new4a; 
if _N_ eq 1; 
AICcstar=AICc; 
do i=1 to 1000; 
output; 
end; 
keep AICcstar; 
 
data ying.bestaic46; 
merge new4a new4b; 
R=exp(-(1/2)*(AICcstar-AICc)); 
if R < sqrt(10); 
 
run; 
 
 
 
